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Comments
AMORTIZATION OF NONCONFORMING USES IN
PENNSYLVANIA: A POSSIBLE REMEDY
FOR A ZONING HEADACHE,
Since the United States Supreme Court announced its decision
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' the constitutional valid-
ity of zoning has not been seriously challenged. 2 While zoning has
afforded local communities the desired means to control the manner
and method of their growth, it has left a number of other zoning
related problems unresolved. One of the most persistent difficul-
ties in this area has been the attempted elimination of those land
uses and structures legally in existence prior to the passage of a
zoning ordinance, yet not in conformity with the ordinance after
its enactment. The continued existence of these nonconforming
uses would hinder, and in some instances render ineffective, a com-
munity's master plan for future development.
This problem is particularly acute in Pennsylvania where the
judiciary has traditionally viewed a nonconforming use as a vested
property right that runs with the land.3 In addition the Pennsyl-
vania courts also -hold that a nonconforming use may reasonably
expand to accommodate increased trade.4 Given these two prin-
ciples, any zoning ordinance enacted in Pennsylvania will continue
to be plagued by these old and often unsightly nonconforming uses.
The law of nuisance may be capable of eliminating some of
these nonconforming uses, but not all nonconforming uses are nuis-
ances. The assertion of eminent domain might eliminate other non-
conforming uses. However, the exercise of that power has two im-
mediate drawbacks. First, eminent domain requires a large finan-
cial expenditure because just compensation must be paid for the
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. R. ANDERsoN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.01 (1968).
3. In re Appeal of Ammon R. Smith Auto Co., 423 Pa. 394, 396, 223
A.2d 683, 684 (1966).
4. Gillfillan's Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 A. 136 (1927). See note 77
and accompanying text infra.
taking of the property in question.5 Few, if any, communities could
afford such an outlay without a significant, if not prohibitive, in-
crease in the local tax base. In addition, the taking of land by
eminent domain must be for a public purpose,6 and it is question-
able whether the use of eminent domain to further zoning objec-
tives would be for a public rather than a private purpose.
In a search for an equitable solution to this dilemma, the courts
of various jurisdictions have attempted to eliminate these noncon-
forming uses in a manner which would give property owners some
form of compensation and at the same time place the method of
elimination within the financial capabilities of the communities. As
a result the doctrine of amortization 7 of nonconforming uses was
formulated. Amortization requres the formulation of a time sched-
ule within which the owner of a nonconforming use must either
conform to the new zoning ordinance or recoup his original capital
investment in the use and move to a new location where the use
is permitted under the new zoning scheme.
A Pennsylvania community which finds amortization a desir-
able vehicle to effect its zoning requirements must successfully
hurdle two obstacles. The framers of an ordinance with an amorti-
zation provision must know whether such provision would be con-
stitutional, a question never answered by the State's appellate
courts.8 In addition the framers must know whether their com-
munity has the power to amortize nonconforming uses. Without
that power, the existence of which is questionable in Pennsylvania,
any attempt to employ amortization would be ultra vires.0
With no firm judicial guidance on either of these issues, the
political subdivisions of Pennsylvania are in an obvious dilemma.
They may either choose to do nothing and thereby allow noncon-
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10: "[Nior
shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority
of law and without just compensation being first made or secured." PA.
CONST. art. 10, § 4: "Municipal and other corporations invested with the
privilege of taking private property for public use shall make just compen-
sation for property taken, injured or destroyed by the construction or en-
largement of their works, highways, or improvements and compensation
shall be paid or secured before the taking, injury, or destruction."
6. Id.
7. See generally Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses,
Buildings, and Structures by Amortization Concept Versus Law, 2 Du-
SQUESNE L. Rav. 1 (1963).
8. There is a definite split of authority in the United States as to the
constitutionality of amoritization of nonconforming uses although a trend
may- be seen in the opinions of appellate courts in this country in favor
of the validity of the amortization doctrine. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1134
(1968). There is no appellate court decision in Pennsylvania that has
squarely decided the issue of the constitutionality of the amortization of
nonconforming uses.
9. See notes 101-52 and accompanying text infra for a full discussion
of the ultra vires issue.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
forming uses to remain and hamper their attempts at planned de-
velopment, or they may elect to enact an amortization ordinance
and force the courts of this State to face the issue.
It will be the purpose of this Comment to discuss both the con-
stitutional and ultra vires issues and to outline the present state
of the law on those subjects in Pennsylvania.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
The constitutions of both the United States and Pennsylvania
provide protection for a property owner. He cannot be deprived
of his property without due process of law, nor may his property
be taken for a public use without just compensation.'" Whet-her
a provision in a zoning ordinance allowing for amortization of non-
conforming uses is constitutional depends on a court's answers to
the following questions:
1. Is a nonconforming use a vested property right that
cannot be divested by zoning legislation short of a com-
munity's exercise of the power of eminent domain?
2. Does amortization of a nonconforming use amount to a
taking such that just compensation must be given by
the taker; and if so, is amortization just compensation?
3. Is amortization a valid exercise of a community's police
power to protect and preserve health, safety, morals,
or the general welfare?
In order to make a determination of what Pennsylvania's posi-
tion on this issue is or should be, it is necessary to first examine
the relevant cases from other jurisdictions which have passed upon
the constitutionality of amortization provisions.
A. Other Jurisdictions
1. Amortization is Constitutional
As early as 1915 the United States Supreme Court decided that
nonconforming uses could be eliminated without violating the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Reinman v. Little Rock" the city council 'had passed an
ordinance prohibiting the operation of livery stables in a downtown
area of Little Rock, Arkansas. Reinman, an operator of such a
business in the restricted area, unsuccessfully sought to have the
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . ." See
note 5 supra.
11. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
city enjoined from enforcing the ordinance on the ground that it
amounted to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The court held that:
[S]o long as the regulation in question is not shown to be
clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and operates uniformly
upon all persons similarly situated in the particular dis-
trict, the district itself not appearing to -have been arbitrar-
ily selected, it cannot be judicially declared that there is a
deprivation of property without due process of law, or a
denial of the equal protection of the laws, within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
1 2
In a similar case, Hadacheck v. Sebastian,13 the city council of
Los Angeles had enacted an ordinance which prohibited the manu-
facture of bricks in a district in which Hadacheck maintained a
brick yard. The plaintiff charged that the ordinance violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court sus-
tained the validity of the enactment, reasoning that the police
power was one of the most essential and least circumscribed powers
of government except when asserted arbitrarily. 14 It stated that:
"[a] vested interest cannot be asserted against [the city govern-
ment] because of conditions once obtaining. To so hold would pre-
clude development and fix a city forever in its primitive condi-
tions."'15
Shortly after the decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.' upholding the constitutionality of zoning, several amortization
provisions were enacted by local communities and their constitu-
tionality litigated in state courts. The first state to uphold an
amortization provision was Louisiana in 1929 in The State ex rel.
Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald.17 The plaintiff brought a private
suit to enjoin the defendant from maintaining a "nuisance" in viola-
tion of a city ordinance which provided for liquidation within one
year of all businesses in a residential district. The defendant had
operated a grocery store in the now restricted area and he refused
to relocate his business. The defendant contended that the zoning
ordinance was unconstitutional because it was arbitrary, unreason-
able and amounted to a taking of the defendant's property without
due process of law.18 The Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the
ordinance and stated:
12. Id. at 177.
13. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
14. Id. at 410.
15. Id. While the Reinman and Hadacheck opinions were couched in
nuisance terminology, i.e., the two cities were told that they could declare
a business that was not a nuisance per se, a nuisance by law, both of the
private businesses involved amounted to nonconforming uses once the ap-
plicable ordinances were enacted and the Court had no difficulty in holding
that their involuntary discontinuances were constitutional..
16. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
17. 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929).
18. 168 La. at 179, 121 So. at 616.
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That zoning ordinances are within the police power of
municipal corporations and are not violative of any consti-
tutional guaranty, state or federal, is now too well settled to
require discussion or citation of authorities ...
The matter is left to the sound judgment and discretion
of the municipal authorities and this discretion will not be
interfered with by the courts, unless its exercise is found
to be manifestly and palpably hostile and unreasonable. 19
Despite this favorable ruling, other states did not authorize
amortization provisions until over twenty years later. One com-
mentator2 0 has suggested that the major reason for this delay was
the states' concern with having their zoning legislation approved
in the state courts. In order to avoid any controversy, provisions
for the elimination of nonconforming uses were left out of en-
abling legislation because of a fear that the vested property right
argument would destroy the legality of the zoning master plans.
In addition the states felt that with the adoption of zoning plans
nonconforming uses would gradually disappear along with the
problem they represented. However, nonconforming uses have
shown no tendency to disappear.
In Standard Oil Company v. Tallahassee 2' the city of Tallahas-
see, Florida, acting pursuant to enabling legislation22 that granted
municipalities the authority to regulate the location and use of
buildings and lands within their boundaries, passed an ordinance
which gave retail gasoline stations in a region around the state
capitol building ten years in which to discontinue operation. In
its decision, a federal court upheld the validity of the ordinance 23
stating that amortization was a reasonable exercise of the zoning
power granted to the city and directly related to the general wel-
fare of the community. Citing Reinman and Hadacheck, the court
indicated that considerations of financial loss or loss of vested rights
in private property were insufficient to outweigh the necessity for
the legitimate exercise of a municipality's police power.
24
Los Angeles v. Gage'- demonstrates a city's successful attempt
to remove a nonconforming business from a residential zone. An-
swering a contention that amortization was unconstitutional, the
court, stressing the compromise nature of amortization and the
19. 168 La. at 179, 183, 121 So. at 616, 617.
20. R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.02 (1968).
21. 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
22. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 176.02 (1966).
23. 183 F.2d at 413.
24. Id.
25. 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
necessity of a reasonable time table, stated:
The distinction between an ordinance restricting
further uses and one requiring the termination of present
uses is merely one of degree, and constitutionality depends
on the relative importance to be given to the public gain
and to the private loss. Zoning as it effects every piece of
property is to some extent retroactive in that it applies to
property already owned at the time of the effective date of
the ordinance. The elimination of existing uses within a
reasonable time does not amount to a taking of property
nor does it necessarily restrict the use of property so that
it cannot be used for a reasonable purpose. Use of a rea-
sonable amortization scheme provides an equitable means
of reconciliation of the conflicting interests in satisfaction
of the due process requirements.
2
By 1970 the Supreme Court of California27 was able to answer a
billboard company's constitutional attack on an amortization ordin-
ance by simply declaring: "[Z]oning legislation may validly pro-
vide for the eventual discontinuance of nonconforming uses within
a prescribed reasonable amortization period commensurate with the
investment involved...."28
In two separate decisions the Maryland Court of Appeals has
upheld the constitutionality of amortization provisions involving
different nonconforming uses. 29 In the first case,30 decided in 1957,
the court refused to enjoin the city of Baltimore from enforcing
a zoning ordinance which provided for the removal of existing bill-
boards from residential areas after a five year amortization period.31
The plaintiff argued that the amortization provision amounted to
an unconstitutional taking without just compensation, a deprivation
of private property without due process, and a denial of equal pro-
tection of the law.
The court brushed these arguments aside reasoning that the
ultimate purpose of zoning was the elimination of nonconforming
uses.3 2 While stating that a call for the immediate cessation of non-
conforming uses would be unreasonable and therefore unconstitu-
tional,3 the court viewed amortization as no different than other
valid methods of restricting a nonconforming use.3 4  In addition,
the majority noted that nonconforming uses were not disappearing
26. 127 Cal. App. 2d at 460, 274 P.2d at 44.
27. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464
P.2d 33, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 946 (1970).
28. 1 Cal. 3d at 878, 464 P.2d at 34, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
29. Shifflett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md. 151, 230 A.2d 310 (1967);
Grant v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363
(1957).
30. Grant v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301,
129 A.2d 363 (1957).
31. 212 Md. at 324, 129 A.2d at 374.
32. Id. at 307, 129 A.2d at 365.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 314-16, 129 A.2d at 369-70.
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as had been expected. 35 Rather, in many instances, the value of
the property harboring the use has increased because of the arti-
ficial monopoly given to their owners by the law. Thus, to deny
the city the power to enact amortization provisions would be to
grant nonconforming uses a perpetual easement.
The billboard company had also argued that the elimination
of nonconforming uses was ultra vires"6 the city's zoning enabling
act. The court rejected this argument reasoning that the absence
of any power to eliminate nonconforming uses was a calculated
omission on the part of the Maryland legislature. By this omission
that legislature intended to demonstrate that nonconforming uses
were not to be given any special protection from zoning ordin-
ances.37 This holding could have profound influence on the out-
come of an amortization case in Pennsylvania.
In the second case,38 decided ten years later, the Maryland
Court of Appeals again upheld an amortization provision in a zon-
ing ordinance. This time the offending uses were junk yards. The
ordinance required that all existing junk yards in areas zoned resi-
dential had to be eliminated within two years. Citing Grant, 9 the
court recognized the principle had been established that legislative
bodies could eliminate nonconforming uses after a reasonable and
appropriately specified time.40 Quoting another Maryland case4 ' the
court held that: "[The Plaintiff] has no vested right in the zoning
classification under which it operated and no right to expect that




The junk dealers had also argued that they should be allowed
to remain in their present location because they were in a remote
rural area and at present were not bothering anyone. The court
approved of the trial judge's position that from this argument it
could reasonably be inferred that they were in an isolated area be-
cause they conducted such an obnoxious enterprise, and to allow
the junk yards to continue would be to allow the dealers to ef-
fectively zone the area to conform with their nonconformity be-
35. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
36. See notes 101-52 and accompanying text infra for a full discussion
of the ultra vires issue.
37. 212 Md. at 323, 129 A.2d at 374.
38. Shifflett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md. 151, 230 A.2d 310 (1967).
39. 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
40. 247 Md. at 154, 230 A.2d at 311.
41. Eutaw Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Baltimore, 241 Md. 686, 217 A.2d
348 (1966).
42. 241 Md. at 696, 217 A.2d at 354, quoted at 247 Md. at 154-55, 230
A.2d at 311.
cause no one would want to move near them.43 The court also in-
dicated that the cost of moving the business and the possible reduc-
tion of the value of the land by its application to residential pur-
poses were not in themselves controlling on the issue in the case.
44
In another junk yard case, Harbison v. City of Buffalo,"3 the
state of New York embraced the amortization doctrine. A city zon-
ing ordinance gave junk dealers three years to discontinue opera-
tion in a residential district. Three years later Harbison was still
in operation and the city ordered him to discontinue his business
immediately. Harbison brought a mandamus action to force the
re-issuance of his junk dealer's license. His initial success at the
lower court level was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 4 1 That
court stated that: "[T]he policy of zoning embraces the concept
of the ultimate elimination of nonconforming uses, and thus the
courts favor reasonable restriction of them.
47
In holding that amortization was a constitutionally valid exer-
cise of the police power the court observed:
To enunciate a contrary rule would mean that the use
of the land ... at the date of the enactment of a zoning
ordinance vests the owner thereof with the right to utilize
the land in that manner in perpetuity, regardless of the
changes in the neighborhood over the course of time. In
the light of our ever expanding urban communities, such a
rule appears to us to constitute an unwarranted restriction
upon the legislature in dealing with [nonconforming uses]
When the termination provisions are reasonable in
the light of the nature of the business of the property
owner, the improvements erected on the land, the character
of the neighborhood, and the detriment caused the prop-
erty owner, we may not hold them constitutionally in-
valid."
Synthesizing the reasoning of the courts which have upheld the
doctrine of amortization, the following pro-amortization arguments
may be adduced:
a. Since zoning is constitutional, amortization is also constitu-
tional.
b. Amortization is constitutional if reasonable.F
c. Amortization is a valid exercise of a state's police power.
d. Amortization is not different in kind from any other valid
restriction on nonconforming uses and therefore is not a
taking but only a restriction on use.
43. 247 Md. at 159, 230 A.2d at 314.
44. 247 Md. at 162, 230 A.2d at 315.
45. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
46. Id. at 564, 152 N.E.2d at 48, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
47. Id. at 559, 152 N.E.2d at 45, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
48. Id. at 562, 152 N.E.2d at 47, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 605. Accord, Uni-
versity Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. 1972), appeal dismissed,
411 U.S. 901 (1973), rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 977 (1973).
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e. A property owner has no permanent vested right in a zon-
ing classification or property use such that it cannot be con-
stitutionally eliminated.
f. Elimination of nonconforming uses is a prime objective of
zoning and nonconforming uses have not disappeared as was
expected.
g. To allow nonconforming uses to continue indefinitely would
be to grant to them a perpetual monopoly and allow their
owners to effectively zone the area regardless of the actual
zoning classification.
h. Amortization is an equitable compromise between the com-
peting interests of the public and the individual property
owner.
2. Amortization is Unconstitutional
Only three states have held that any attempt to amortize non-
conforming uses is unconstitutional.49 In Demull v. Lowell50 the
Michigan Supreme Court held that the town of Lowell lacked the
authority to pass an ordinance calling for the elimination of non-
conforming uses within three years. In the course of drafting zon-
ing enabling legislation, the Michigan legislature consulted the at-
torney general's office on the constitutionality of amortization.5 '
After the attorney general replied that his office considered amorti-
zation unconstitutional, all mention of it was left out of the enab-
ling legislation.5 2 Instead, the legislature granted Michigan muni-
cipalities the authority to use the power of eminent domain to pur-
chase nonconforming uses. 53 The court therefore felt that amorti-
zation would be a taking for which just compensation must be made
and that eminent domain proceedings were the proper vehicle for
elimination of nonconforming uses.
54
In the Ohio case of Akron v. Chapman55 the city had passed
49. Michigan, Ohio, and Missouri. See notes 50-63 and accompanying
text infra.
50. 368 Mich. 242, 118 N.W.2d 232 (1962).
51. No opinion on the constitutionality of amortization of nonconform-
ing uses has ever been written by the Attorney General of Pennsylvania.
52. 368 Mich. at 252, 118 N.W.2d at 237.
53. MICH STAT. ANN. § 5.2933(1) (1969) provides:
In addition to the power granted in this section, cities and
villages may acquire by purchase, condemnation or otherwise pri-
vate property for the removal of nonconforming uses and struc-
tures....
54. 368 Mich. at 252-53, 118 N.W.2d at 237-38.
55. 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697, 52 Ohio Op. 242 (1953).
an ordinance that provided for the cessation of nonconforming uses
after a time deemed to be reasonable by the city council. As a
result, the defendant junk dealer was in danger of being squeezed
out. of a business that he had operated for more than twenty-eight
years. The court reasoned 6 that zoning ordinances contemplated
the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses within a zoned area.
Where an ordinance accomplished that result without depriving a
property owner of a vested property right, it would be deemed con-
stitutional. However, the court felt that the effect of the instant
ordinance worked to deprive the dealer of a continued lawful use
of his property and was, therefore, in violation of the due process
clause of both the state and federal constitutions.
57
In a thorough analysis of amortization, the Supreme Court of
Missouri held unconstitutional a zoning ordinance passed by the
city of St. Louis, providing for the amortization of a nonconforming
lumber yard located in a residential zone within six years. 8 The
court found the city's attempt to terminate prior existing noncon-
forming uses by amortization an unconstitutional taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. The court
brushed aside the city's argument that amortization is justified as
an exercise of its police power. Rather, the court indicated that
this power is always subject to, and never allowed to transcend,
constitutional rights and limitations.5 9 The fact that the lumber
yard owner was given six years to leave the area made it no less
a taking than if the ordinance had called for an immediate cessation.
A delayed taking of private property for public use without just
compensation was still unconstitutional. 0 Quoting Justice Holmes
the court stated:
[W] e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change."1
The court acknowledged that although this was a case of first
impression, all previous statements by the lower courts of Missouri
recognized nonconforming uses as a vested property right not sub-
ject to divestment absent just compensation.2 As a result, the
court concluded:
[A] lthough the holdings in other jurisdictions may, in some
instances, be enlightening and persuasive, it is neither our
duty nor our inclination to rule on a question of first im-
pression in this state simuly by counting foreign cases and
56. 160 Ohio St. at 386, 116 N.E.2d at 699, 52 Ohio Op. at 244.
57. Id. at 388-89, 116 N.E.2d at 700, 52 Ohio Op. at 245.
58. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965).
59. Id. at 754-55.
60. Id. at 753.
61. Id. (quoting from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
416 (1922)).
62. 389 S.W.2d at 749.
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then falling off the judicial fence cn the side on which more
cases can be found.
6 3
This holding could prove ominous for all advocates of amortiza-
tion in Pennsylvania.
Thus it appears that three anti-amortization arguments have
found limited acceptance:
a. The owner of a nonconforming use has a vested prop-
erty right in the continued lawful use of his property
which cannot be divested by a zoning ordinance pro-
vision calling for the amortizatiaon of that nonconform-
ing use with the object of eliminating it.
b. Amortization is a delayed taking and as such amounts
to a taking for public use of private property for which
just compensation must be paid. An amortization per-
iod in which to recoup capital investment is not just
compensation.
c. Amortization without compensation is unconstitutional.
B. The Pennsylvania Position on the Constitutionality of Amorti-
zation.
Justice Cohen in Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 4 sum-
marized the source of a Pennsylvania municipality's zoning power
and its constitutional limitations:
Zoning is the legislative division of a community into areas
in each of which only certain designated uses of land are
permitted so that the community may develop in an orderly
manner in accordance with a comprehensive plan. The
authority of the legislature to permit the zoning is derived
. . . from the governmental power of the Commonwealth
-the 'police power.'
The only restrictions upon the power . . . are imposed
by Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. ...
However, neither . . . was intended to interfere with rea-
sonable property regulations, whether established by the
state or by some public body acting under its sanction,
which are designed to accomplish a legitimate public pur-
pose.
In delineating the concept of a legitimate public pur-
pose the courts have repeatedly held that property regula-
tions which are substantially related to preserving or pro-
moting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare
are constitutionally not objectionable. And thus the test
of constitutionality of a zoning ordinance is whether the
63. Id. at 752.
64. 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the inhabitants
of that part of the community effected will be promoted by
the application of the ordinance. 5
The above test has been the law in Pennsylvania since White's
Appeal"6 in 1926. In that case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
in striking down a Pittsburgh zoning ordinance, distinguished be-
tween the exercise of the police power, where the use of property
by the owner was regulated for the public good without any com-
pensation, and the exercise of the power of eminent domain, where
property is taken for a public purpose with just compensation. 7
The court stated: "Regulation under a proper exercise of the police
power is due process, even though a property in whole or in part




It is obvious that the court was considering only extraordinary
situations in which the police power might be exercised and the
court did not intend to grant municipalities the unrestricted au-
thority to remove nonconforming uses which were not openly of-
fensive to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. For
in the later case of Appeal of Lord 69 Justice Bell wrote that zon-
ing ordinances were only valid and constitutional if they were
necessary to preserve the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare and they were not unjustly discriminatory, arbitrary, un-
reasonable, or confiscatory in their application to a particular or
specific piece of property. 0
In light of the above, how would the Pennsplvania appellate
courts deal with a zoning ordinance containing an amortization pro-
vision? Dicta, scattered throughout the Pennsylvania case law on
zoning, states in one form or another that nonconforming uses are
entitled to constitutional protection. In addition, two county court
decisions came to opposite conclusions on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of amortization of nonconforming uses.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated in Whitpain
Township v. Bodine7 that a nonconforming use in existence prior
to the passage of a zoning ordinance is protected.72 However, this
protection is not afforded solely to prolong the life of a noncon-
forming use. Rather, as the court stated in Hanna v. Board of
Adjustment:
73
The continuance of nonconforming uses under zoning or-
dinances is countenanced because it avoids the imposition
of a hardship upon the property owner and because refusal
65. 393 Pa. at 110-12, 141 A.2d at 609-10.
66. 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
67. Id. at 264, 134 A. at 411.
68. Id.
69. 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533 (1951).
70. Id. at 125-26, 81 A.2d at 535 and see cases cited therein.
71. 372 Pa. 509, 94 A.2d 737 (1953).
72. Id. at 512, 94 A.2d at 739.
73. 408 Pa. 306, 183 A.2d 539 (1962).
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of the continuance of a nonconforming use would be of
doubtful constitutionality.
74
More recently the Commonwealth Court in City of Philadel-
phia v. Angelone75 said: "Constitutional limitations require that
nonconforming uses be permitted to continue. They are not, how-
ever, favorites of the law."7 6
While nonconforming uses are not favorites of the law, they
have met with something more than mere indifference by the Penn-
sylvania judiciary. Since 1927 the courts have recognized the ex-
pansion doctrine.7 7 This doctrine holds that a nonconforming use
may naturally expand to accommodate increased trade. This rule
has been tempered somewhat by Silver v. Zoning Board of Adjust-
ment.78 There the court stated that the right to expand was not
unlimited. This expansion of the nonconforming use could not be
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare.79
Although there has been much dicta s° on nonconforming uses,
there are only a handful of Pennsylvania cases in which the amor-
tization of a nonconforming use was at issue. Only one, Township
of Concord v. Cornogg,8 1 had held the elimination of nonconforming
uses to be unconstitutional. There the court held that the amortiza-
tion provision of a zoning ordinance, giving the defendant owner
of a nonconforming billboard six months in which to remove the
structure, was violative of both the Pennsylvania and Federal Con-
stitutions as a deprivation of property without due process of law.
8 2
The court, quoting Drago v. Norristown Borough Board of Adjust-
ment8", stated that:
While it is true that the appellate courts have become more
liberal in upholding the constitutionality of zoning ordin-
ances, yet no case seems to have gone so far as to sustain an
ordinance in effect legislating out of existence an existing
legal business.
84
Drago was a 1945 case from Montgomery County. It concerned
74. 408 Pa. at 312, 183 A.2d at 543.
75. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 119, 280 A.2d 672 (1971).
76. Id. at 127, 280 A.2d at 676.
77. Gillfillan's Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 A. 136 (1927).
78. 435 Pa. 99, 255 A.2d 506 (1969).
79. Id. at 102, 255 A.2d at 507.
80. See, e.g., Township of Newton v. Neal, 30 Del. 298, 300 (Pa. C.P.
1941); King of Prussia Associates v. Upper Merion Twp., 91 Montgomery
56, 59 (Pa. C.P. 1969), appeal dismissed, 437 Pa. 576, 262 A.2d 856 (1970).
81. 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 79 (C.P. Del. 1956).
82. Id. at 88.
83. 53 Pa. D. & C. 380 (C.P. Montgomery 1945).
84. 9 Pa. D. & C.2d at 87.
a zoning ordinance of a borough which granted to the board of ad-
justment the discretionary power to amortize a nonconforming use.
Neighbors of a nonconforming junk yard, unsuccessful in their at-
tempt to persuade the board to amortize, brought suit in common
pleas court. The co-defendant junk yard owner complained that
the provision was unconstitutional. The court refused to allow the
dealer to raise the issue, because the board had already ruled in
his favor, and went on to uphold the board's action as a proper
exercise of its discretion. 5
A similar evasion of the issue, this time by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, occurred in Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
City of Clairton.86 The city had passed an ordinance giving noncon-
forming billboard owners five years in which to remove the struc-
tures. At the end of the five years, the plaintiff alleged the ordin-
ance was unconstitutional and brought a bill in equity to enjoin
its enforcement. The city moved to dismiss the bill on the ground
that the statutory remedy provided was adequate. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court agreed.87 As a result of this ruling, the
argument of unconstitutionality was ignored and the plaintiff was
instructed to exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking re-
lief in the courts. A vigorous dissent8s by Justice Bell argued that
the court should have declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
For advocates of amortization of nonconforming uses there is
one ray of hope in the Pennsylvania case law, In re Appeal of Am-
mon Smith Auto Co.8 9 West Manchester Township adopted a zon-
ing ordinance classifying as commercial a district in which Smith
operated a car lot. The ordinance further provided that all flashing
lights were prohibited in all zones of the township, and that all
nonconforming signs had to be corrected within ninety days.
Smith, the owner of four flashing lights, after unsuccessfully ex-
hausting his administrative remedies, appealed to the York County
Court of Common Pleas where he argued that the ordinance was
an attempt to amortize nonconforming uses and as such was uncon-
stitutional. The court in a surprising opinion disagreed. Citing
several pro-amortization cases9" from other states and relying heav-
85. 53 Pa. D. & C. at 382-83.
86. 390 Pa. 1, 133 A.2d 542 (1957).
87. Id. at 9, 133 A.2d at 546.
88. 390 Pa. 1, 12, 133 A.2d 542, 547 (1957) (Bell, J., dissenting).
89. 79 York 145 (Pa. C.P. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 423 Pa. 493,
223 A.2d 683 (1966).
90. Standaid Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950); Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274
P.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Spurgeon v. Board of Commissioners, 181
Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby,
168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald,
168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929); Grant v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957); Wolf v.
Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964); McKinney v. Riley, 105 N.H.




ily on the reasoning of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Grant
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,9 1 the court held that this
particular provision of the zoning ordinance was not constitu-
tionally invalid.9 2 In addition the court commented:
The right of termination of particular nonconforming uses
will have to continue to be fought out on a case by case
basis in the light of the particular structure, use, location,
cost, public effect, period of use and amortization period
involved. Such disputes will continue to engage the con-
flict of the philosophies of private rights against public
benefit.95
The court saw the amortization scheme as a reasonable method
of eliminating the nonconforming lights, the flashing aspect of
which was possibly confusing and hazardous to passing motorists.
As potential hazards, these flashing lights could be eliminated by
the township as a valid exercise of its police power. And amortiza-
tion was seen as no different in kind than any other constitutional
restriction on nonconforming uses.
94
Smith appealed this decision and with a perfect chance to rule
on the constitutionality of amortization of nonconforming uses once
again before them, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court95 reversed the
decision on other grounds. The ordinance was found to be invalid
as an improper exercise of the township's police power because it
was a blanket township wide prohibition of blinking signs and as
such it was patently unreasonable.9 6
It appears that Justice Bell in writing the opinion for the ma-
jority was tempted to rule on the constitutionality of the amortiza-
tion provision when he stated that:
The traditional Pennsylvania viewpoint favors land
owners, based upon the principle that a lawful noncon-
forming use established in the property owner a vested
property right which runs with the land and cannot be ab-
rogated or destroyed unless it is a nuisance or is extin-
guished by eminent domain.
The opposite conclusion, i.e., the right to limit, restrict
or abolish the use of signs on one's own property, is based
upon the police power when it is used to reasonably affect
health or safety or morals and is not arbitrary or discrim-
91. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
92. 79 York at 150.
93. Id. at 147.
94. Id. at 149.
95. In re Appeal of Ammon R. Smith Auto Co., 423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d
683 (1966).
96. Id. at 497, 223 A.2d at 685.
inatory; in such circumstances it is paramount to the rights
of every property owner.
97
By this statement Justice Bell seemed to recognize the validity of
the pro-amortization argument. However, by holding that the
ordinance was patently unreasonable, the court left unanswered the
question whether an amortization provision within a reasonable
zoning ordinance would be constitutional.
Although Justice Bell had wanted to hold the amortization
ordinance in Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Clair-
ton unconstitutional,98 he was not so willing to do so in the present
case. This may have been because the township argued9" that in
order to comply with the ordinance Smith needed only to remove
the flashing feature of the signs and that he was not required to
remove or dismantle them. The township's attorney argued that
since neither removal nor dismantling was required, the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance need not be passed on by the court be-
cause: "It is established law in Pennsylvania that a constitutional
question will not be passed on unless it is absolutely necessary to
decide the case before the court."100 The court, adhering to this
policy, reversed on other grounds. Once again the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court failed to make use of an opportunity to settle the
amortization issue.
The above discussion of the constitutional issue may be sum-
marized in three parts.
1. Assorted dicta in the Pennsylvania case law states that
the owner of a prior existing nonconforming use has a
vested property right in that use. He cannot be di-
vested of this right without due process of law and just
compensation.
2. In only one Pennsylvania case has a court definitely de-
cided that amortization of nonconforming uses is un-
constitutional. And only one lower court case has held
amortization of nonconforming uses to be constitutional.
3. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court when presented with
the opportunity has refused to directly decide the con-
stitutionality of amortization of nonconforming uses.
II. THE ULTRA VINEs ISSUES IN PENNSYLVANIA
If for the sake of argument it is assumed that amortization of
nonconforming uses is constitutional in Pennsylvania, no political
subdivision of the state may exercise this method of zoning unless
it has been granted the power to do so. To do otherwise would
be ultra vires. Counties, cities, boroughs and townships in Penn-
97. 423 Pa. at 496, 223 A.2d at 684.
98. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
99. Brief for Appellee at 2-3, In re Appeal of Ammon R. Smith Auto
Co., 423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d 683 (1966).
100. Id. at 2.
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sylvania have for some time had the power to zone 10 ' and continue
to have that power under the consolidating statute known as the
Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)'0 2 adopted in 1968 and
amended in 1972.
However, whether the MPC, or those acts left unaffected by
it, also grant political subdivisions the power to amortize noncon-
forming uses is questionable. Although no section of the MPC
specifically states that nonconforming uses may be eliminated, it
can be argued that the power to eliminate nonconforming uses is
an implied power inherent in the explicitly granted power to zone.
In addition, nowhere in the MPC are nonconforming uses granted
any specific protection.
10 3
Prior to the adoption of the MPC, the Borough Code and the
several township and city codes granted to those municipalities no
specific authority to amortize nonconforming uses. However, the
wording of the grants of power in all of these codes authorized the
respective municipalities to restrict and regulate the location and
use of structures and land.
0 4
In contrast, the county code (applicable to third through eighth
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 14752 (1957) (cities of The First Class);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 25051 (1957) (cities of The Second Class); and
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 5220 (1956) (Second Class County Code) are grants
of zoning power which, along with their respective following sections con-
cering zoning, are still in force. All sections of the Borough Code, the First
Class Township Code, the Second Class Township Code, the Third Class
City Code, and the County Code, which were concerned with the power
to zone were specifically repealed by the MPC: PA-. STAT. ANN. "tit. 53, §
11201 (1972).
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (1972), as amended by, Act
of June 1, 1972, No. 93, [1972], P.L. -.
103. However, the cases discussed previously in which amortization was
found to be constitutional arose in jurisdictions with zoning enabling stat-
utes that made no reference to the protection or elimination of nonconform-
ing uses. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850 (West. Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.02 (1966); LA. ACTS 1926, No. 240, § 2, as amended, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33:4722 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 2.01 (1970); N.Y.
GEN. Crry LAW § 20(24), (25) (McKinney 1968); Tzx. REV. CiV. STAT. art.
1Olla (1963).
104. E.g., Act of February 1, 1966, No. 581, § 3201, [1965], P.L. 1656 (re-
pealed 1968) (The Borough Code) provided:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the
general welfare, councils of boroughs are hereby empowered to
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of
buildings and other structures, their construction, alteration, ex-
tension, repair, maintenance and all facilities and services in or
about such buildings and structures and percentage of lot that
may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces,
the density of population, and the location and use of buildings,
structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other pur-
poses, and also to establish and maintain building lines and set
back building lines upon any or all streets.
class counties) and the second class county code specifically au-
thorized these counties to amortize nonconforming uses. 1 5 This
authorization was in addition to the power to regulate location and
use of structures and land.106 The jurisdiction of the counties ex-
tended to any portion of the county that did not lie within a city,
borough, or township having a zoning ordinance in effect.
10 7
In 1968, in order "[t]o accomplish a coordinated development
of municipalities, other than cities of the first and second classes
' ,108 the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the MPC.109
The new code was made applicable to incorporated towns, boroughs,
townships, and certain cities (2nd class A and 3rd class) including
those within second class counties and counties of the class 2A.1 0
Philadelphia, the only first class city, and Pittsburgh, the only
second class city, were thus left to go their own ways on zoning,
within the bounds of their enabling acts.
The MPC specifically repealed all prior grants of zoning and
planning power made to municipalities and counties (classes 3
through 8). 1 1' However, by an interesting loophole the second class
county code was repealed only insofar as it applied to class 2A coun-
ties. 11 2 As a result, Allegheny County (the only second class
county) was left as the only political subdivision in the state with
the specific power to amortize nonconforming uses. The general
repealer section of the MPC1 '3 repealed all other acts insofar as
they were inconsistent with the MPC, yet the second class county
exception can hardly be called inconsistent since it was specifically
granted.
If amortization of nonconforming uses is found to be ultra vires
as to all other subdivisions, the ultimate effect of the Allegheny
County loophole would probably be minimal because any amortiza-
105. Act of Aug. 9, 1955, No. 130, § 2033(a), [1955], P.L. 323 (repealed
1968) (The County Code) provided and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 233(a)
(1956) (The Second Class County Code) provides:
The board of county commissioners may, in any zoning ordinance,
provide for the termination of nonconforming uses, either by spe-
cifying the period or periods in which nonconforming uses shall
be required to cease, or by providing a formula or formulae
whereby the compulsory termination of a nonconforming use may
be so fixed as to allow for the recovery or amortization of the
investment in the nonconformance.
The identical language was used in both statutes.
106. Act of Aug. 9, 1955, No. 130, § 2020, [1955], P.L. 323 (repealed 1968)
(The County Code) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 5220 (1956) (The Second
Class County Code).
107. Id.
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53. § 10105 (1972).
109. See note 102 supra.
110. See historical note to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10101 (1972) or Title
to Act of July 31, 1968, No. 247, [1968], P.L. 805, as amended by Act of
June 1, 1972, No. 93, [1972], P.L. -.
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11201(1)-(7) (1972).
112. Id. § 11201(8).
113. Id. § 11202.
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tion ordinance enacted by the county would be repealed pro tanto
by any zoning ordinance enacted by a municipality within Alle-
gheny County.114 However, the exemption lends support to an
argument that the legislature meant to confer amortization power
on the municipalities, for if the opposite were true why would they
have allowed only one county to continue to have that power?
One interesting change provided by the MPC is that while the
grants of power in the old codes were limited to regulation and
restriction of location and use of structures and land,11 5 the MPC
includes the power not only to regulate and restrict, but also the
power to permit or prohibit location, maintenance and use of struc-
tures and land.116 In addition, zoning ordinances may contain pro-
visions for special exceptions, variances, and conditional uses and
"such other provisions as may be necessary to implement the pur-
poses of this act.
'111
While the ordinance provision section is optional,"" the zoning
purposes section119 is mandatory. 120 Zoning ordinance provisions
must be designed "to promote, protect, and facilitate one or more
of the following: public health, safety, morals, general welfare, co-
ordinated practical community development. . .2 as well as [t]o
prevent one or more of the following: overcrowding of land, blight,
danger .... ,,"2" "In case any building, structure or land is...
maintained or used in violation of any ordinance . . . ," the munici-
pality may institute appropriate action to abate any buildings,
structure, land or use constituting a violation.
23
Two sections of the MPC specifically deal with nonconforming
uses. One authorizes the option to provide for additional classifica-
tions for the purpose of regulating nonconforming uses and struc-
tures.12 4 The other states a mandatory requirement that all ordin-
ances must include a provision requiring the zoning officer to iden-
tify and register nonconforming structures and uses.1 25 In light
of the broad zoning power granted in the sections on provisions and
114. Id. § 10602.
115. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603 (1972).
117. Id.
118. Id. This section provides: "Zoning ordinances may permit, pro-
hibit, regulate, restrict, and determine. . . . In addition, zoning ordinances
may contain. .. ."
119. Id. § 10604.
120. Id. § 10604(1).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 10604(2) (emphasis added).
123. Id. § 10617 (emphasis added).
124. Id. § 10605(1.1).
125. Id. § 10613.
purposes, 2 6 these two sections dealing directly with nonconforming
uses could be argued to be merely administrative sections insuring
that those in possession of nonconforming uses will not be deprived
of due process when an ordinance calls for their elimination. No-
where is it indicated that nonconforming uses are to be granted
a protected status, immune from the broad authorizations in the
grant of zoning power. However, no meaningful interpretation of
the MPC can be made without consulting the case law on judicial
construction of zoning ordinances and the Pennsylvania statute
dealing with statutory construction.
127
The decisions 2 8 of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the au-
thority of a local government to enact zoning legislation were initi-
ally in full compliance with Dillon's Rule.129 Dillon, Chief Justice
of the Iowa Supreme Court in the middle of the last century, stated
in his treatise on municipal corporations:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the fol-
lowing powers, and no others: First those granted in ex-
press words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied
in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the declared objects, and purposes of the cor-
poration-not simply convenient, but indispensible. Any
fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power
is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the
power is denied .... 110
However, this doctrine was expressly overruled by the court
in Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment.1 3 ' In this
case the court pointed out that the Statutory Construction Act'
1 2
provided that the rule that statutes in derogation of the common
law were to be strictly construed was to have no application to
statutes passed in Pennsylvania after September 1, 1937. After that
date, statutes were to be liberally construed to effect their objec-
tives and to promote justice. l s However, since the Act defined
"statute" as an act of the General Assembly,18 4 the court found that
the liberal construction rule was inapplicable to zoning ordinances
passed by local governments.
1 5
126. See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
127. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, No. 290, §§ 1921-1939, 1951-1957, 1961-1963,
1971-1978, 1991, [1972], P.L. -. (The Statutory Construction Act).
128. E.g., Ewes v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of Lower Gwynedd Twp., 401
Pa. 211, 167 A.2d 7 (1960); Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438,
443, 68 A.2d 182, 185 (1949).
129. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1st ed. 1872).
130. Id.
131. 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
132. Act of May 28, 1937, No. 282, §§ 1-102, [1937], P.L. 1019 (repealed
1972).
133. Id. § 58.
134. Id. § 2 provided: "Law means an act of Assembly of this Com-
monwealth."
135. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43,
49, 228 A.2d 169, 174 (1967).
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At first glance Exton Quarries might be interpreted as invali-
dating amortization clauses. Because a zoning ordinance including
such a provision would be in derogation of the common law, it
would be strictly construed as ultra vires the legislative powers of
the municipality. However, if the enabling statute is liberally con-
strued as including a grant of power to amortize nonconforming
uses, then even a strict construction of the ordinance would uphold
such a provision.
The new statutory guidese states that: "When the words of
a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not
to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit."'3 7 It
could be argued that the MPC is not ambiguous on the question
of amortization and therefore there is no need to consult the rules
of statutory construction. However, there is ambiguity in the code
because although there is no specific protection provided for non-
conforming uses in the MPC, there is also no specific grant of power
allowing for their elimination. 138
The Act further states factors for consideration when attempt-
ing to determine the intention of the legislature as: 19
1. The occasion and necessity for the statute.
2. The circumstances under which it was enacted.
3. The mischief to be remedied.
4. The object to be attained.
5. The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the
same or similar subjects.
6. The consequences of a particular interpretation.
7. The contemporaneous legislative history.
8. Legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.
The first five factors have been covered in the discussion above.
The results of a consideration of number six are obvious. A strict
interpretation will result in a denial of the existence of the power
to amortize. A liberal approach will yield the opposite conclusion.
Factors seven and eight present problems for amortization support-
ers. An inquiry into the legislative history of the MPC discloses
that there was an attempt to include authorization for amortization
of nonconforming uses by the Senate but the House was successful
136. See note 127 supra (The Statutory Construction Act).
137. Id. § 1921(b).
138. Except for that intentional or unintentional, and therefore ambig-
uous, power to eliminate left in the hands of Second Class Counties. See
note 105 supra.
139. See note 127 supra (The Statutory Construction Act § 1921(c)).
in having the pertinent amortization sections deleted from the MPC
as it was finally enacted. 140  But the fact remains that the counties
(3d through 8th class) had the power to amortize by a specific grant
of power prior to the enactment of the MPC and no specific authori-
zation was given in the MPC. 1 4 1  If the General Assembly had
wanted to allow amortization under the MPC it would have been
easy to include a provision covering the subject in plain language.
An inference undoubtedly arises that they intended no such author-
ization.
On the other hand, it could be argued that there are two contra-
dictory interests present in the MPC that cancel each other out,
leaving the courts free to decide the ultra vires issue. Perhaps,
not wishing to confront the issue of constitutionality of amortiza-
tion of nonconforming uses and under influential constituent pres-
sure, the legislators excluded the amortization clause. At the same
time they passed a code granting broad zoning powers to munici-
palities within which the power to eliminate nonconforming uses
might be implied. As a result the legislature could take credit for
a sweeping consolidation of zoning and planning laws and leave
the ultra vires and constitutional questions surrounding elimination
of nonconforming uses up to the courts. If the courts were to hold
that amortization was a valid exercise of granted zoning power, any
adverse criticism directed at the legislature could be deflected to
the judiciary. Although this argument implies a certain type of
behavior on the part of the legislature, it is not necessarily an unbe-
lievable scenario.
In addition to the above factors to be considered by a court
construing a statute, there are three statutory presumptions rele-
vant to the ultra vires issue. They are:
1. When a court of last resort has construed the language
used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent
statutes on the same subject matter intends the same
construction to be placed upon such language.
142
140. Senate Bill 1148 originally authorized amortization of nonconform-
ing uses of land, nonconforming uses of conforming structures and noncon-
forming signs. See S.B. 1148, §§ 614(b), 615(b), Printer's Number 1334,
1967 Session. After emerging from the House Committee on Municipal Cor-
porations, S.B. 1148 authorized only amortization of nonconforming signs.
See S.B. 1148, §§ 613, 614(b), Printer's Number 2200, 1967 Session. On third
consideration by the House the authorization for amortization of noncon-
forming signs remained. See S.B. 1148 § 614(b), Printer's Number 2278,
1967 Session. However, on July 16, 1968 Rep. Holman (R-Perry Co. 86th
Dist.) moved that the House reconsider S.B. 1418 and he introduced several
amendments one of which deleted the authorization for amortization of non-
conlorming signs. The amendments passed by a voice vote with no debate.
See 1 PA. LEGIS. JOUR.-HousE 1519 (1968 Session). On July 17, 1968 the
Senate concurred in the House amendment by a vote of 49-0 without debate.
See 1 PA. LEzas. JOUR.-SENATE 626 (1968 Session). Thus, S.B. 1148 was de-
nuded of any reference to amortization of nonconforming uses.
141. Compare Act of Aug. 9, 1955, No. 130, § 2033, [1955], P.L. 323 (re-
pealed 1968) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10602, 10603 (1972).
142. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, No. 290, § 1922(4), [1972], P.L. -.
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2. The General Assembly intends to favor the public in-
terest as against any private interest.'4 3
3. No statute shall be construed as retroactive unless
clearly and manifestly so intended by the General As-
sembly.'" Retroactive provisions in statutes are to be
strictly construed.'4 5
As for the first presumption, no appellate court has ever ruled on
the issue of a municipality's power to eliminate nonconforming uses.
There are only the two county court decisions 146 on the issue and
these courts came to opposite conclusions. There is, in addition,
some dicta to the effect that amortization of nonconforming uses
is unconstitutional. 47 In enacting the MPC without including any
specific authorization for amortizing, the legislature might be seen
as having ratified the judicial interpretations of prior statutes deal-
ing with the same subject matter.
The second presumption lends some aid to pro-amortization
forces. The elimination of nonconforming uses will generally make
a community more pleasing to the eye and in the long run enhance
the property values of a majority of the public. While the owners
of nonconforming property are also members of the public it could
be argued that their interests should be subordinate to the interests
of the community at large.
It is clear that an amortization provision would have some re-
troactive affect by depriving the owner of a nonconforming use of
his property right. Although it could be argued that the grant of
power in the MPC allows for a retroactive operation of its prin-
ciples, the absence of any specific power to amrrtize raises a coun-
tervailing inference. Where general language of a statute can be
interpreted as granting retrospective and prospective powers, the
courts will favor the prospective application only, in the absence
of clear language giving it retrospective effect. 148 However, if one
takes the position of the Maryland court in Grant 49 or the Calif-
ornia court in Gage' 50 that amortization is no different in kind than
zoning which restricts further use, the retrospective authorization
143. Id. § 1922(5).
144. Id. § 1926.
145. Id. § 1928(b) (2).
146. See note 81 and 89 and accompanying text supra.
147. See notes 71-80 and accompanying text supra.
148. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Foreno v. Garfinkel, 69 F. Supp. 846
(W.D. Pa. 1947), aff'd, 166 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1948); Glancey v. Casey, 447
Pa. 77, 288 A.2d 812 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Greenwalt v. Greenwalt,
347 Pa. 510, 32 A.2d 757 (1943).
149. See notes 30 and 91 and accompanying text supra.
150. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
can be seen as necessarily implicit in the power to permit, prohibit,
regulate and restrict location and use of structures and land.
1 51
Thus, the arguments both pro and con on the ultra vires ques-
tion can be summarized as follows:
A. The amortization of nonconforming uses is ultra vires
in Pennsylvania.
1. All zoning power rests with the state legislature.
Whatever power that is not granted by that body
is retained. The power to eliminate nonconforming
uses was not specifically granted in the MPC.
Therefore it was retained at the state level.
2. The power to amortize in the county code was eli-
minated in the MPC thereby showing that the legis-
lature was ratifying the judicial dicta on the subject
to the effect that the amortization of nonconform-
ing uses is ultra vires the powers of any political
subdivision.
3. The legislative history of the MPC shows that an
amortization provision was purposely omitted.
4. Zoning enabling statutes may be liberally construed
but all retroactive provisions are to be given a strict
construction.
B. Amortization is a valid exercise of a municipality's
granted power.
1. The MPC is not ambiguous, therefore resort to the
rules of statutory construction is unnecessary.
2. The specific power granted in the MPC to prohibit
location and use of structures and land in conjunc-
tion with the stated purpose of the MPC carries
with it the necessary implication that the MPC was
to be given a retroactive operation no different in
kind than prospective zoning.
3. The legislative history of the MPC is inconclusive.
4. No appellate court in Pennsylvania has ever ruled
on the question of amortization, therefore the legis-
lature cannot be seen as having ratified any firm
judicial doctrine when it enacted the MPC.
III. CONCLUSION
From the above discussion it is clear that the courts of Pennsyl-
vania have enough legal ammunition to frame an argument sup-
porting a holding that amortization of nonconforming uses would
be neither ultra vires nor unconstitutional. The broad language
of the grant of power in the MPC and a community's inherent po-
lice power could be seen as placing the elimination of nonconform-
ing uses within the authority of a municipality. In addition, the
United States Supreme Court has seen no Federal Constitutional
impediment to the elimination of nonconforming uses since the 1915
151. See note 103 supra.
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cases of Reinman152 and Hadacheck.1 5 That fact, along with the
case law of those states which have validated amortization, would
provide ample support for Pennsylvania to hold likewise.
However, for the benefit of those charged with reaching a deci-
sion on the issue of the legality of amortization, a cautionary note
should be added. They would be wise to consider a statement made
by the Supreme Court of Texas over fifty years ago:
To secure their property was one of the great ends for
which men entered society. The right to acquire and own
property and to deal with it and use it as the owner
chooses, so long as the use harms nobody, is a natural right.
It does not owe its origins to constitutions. It existed be-
fore them. It is a part of the citizen's natural liberty-an
expression of his freedom, guaranteed as inviolate by every
American Bill of Rights.
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152. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915). See note 11 and ac-
companying text supra.
153. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). See note 13 and ac-
comnanying text supra.
154. Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 356, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (1921).
